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188 ' NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
basis for computing depreciation under both rules is the useful life of the
property.22 A tenable argument apparently not presented by the petitioner
is that Congress in the Revenue Act of 1928, did not intend to change the
law as to depreciation in the case of life tenants but only to introduce a simple
and concise rule for computing depreciation, thereby eliminating the con-
fusion produced by the rule of apportionment. Therefore, since improve-
ments made by the life tenant were excepted under the Revenue Act of
1921,23 they should also be excepted under the Revenue Act of 1928 and
thus under the present provision, which is a carry-over of the 1928 legis-
lation.
Clearly, the petitioner in this case was the victim of an unfortunate de-
cision. The fact that the cost was recovered within the first five years of the
building's use rebuts any presumption that a gift to the daughter was intend-
ed.24 But on the death of the petitioner her estate will be unable to recover
the undepreciated cost of the building from the remainderman because it is
well settled that a life tenant cannot burden the estate of the remainderman
with the cost of improvements even if they enhance the value of the prop-
erty. 25 The result reached by the court may therefore be criticized on the
ground that it discourages legitimate business enterprises and forces life
tenants to allow valuable business property to fall into ruin because of natural
wear and tear, obsolescence, and changing conditions. Appropriate legis-
lation to allow life tenants to depreciate improvements financed by them over
their life expectancies would appear to be distinctly desirable.
JOHN G. MUrsciEat
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS - IGNORANCE OF EXISTENCE OF THE CAUSE OF
ACTION - STATUTE BARRED UNDISCOVERED CAUSE OF ACTION FOR MAL-
PRACTICE, - The defendant performed an operation upon the plaintiff on
December 8, 1942, and negligently failed to remove a surgical sponge from
22. By applying the rule of apportionment used under the 1921 act to a hypo-
thetical case where the life expectancy of the life tenant is 10 years, the useful life of
the property is 20 years, and the present value of the property is $20,000, the follow-
ing result is reached:
10/20 x $20,000 = $10,000 - 10 - $1000 annual depreciation.
Applying the rule of the present act to the same case, the same result is reached:
$20,000 - 20 = $1000 annual depreciation.
The similarity in results illustrates the fact that the present act is merely a
codification of the judicially-developed rule of apportionment applied to improved
property under the Revenue Act of 1921.
23. See note 19 supra.
24. The building was erected in 1938 at a cost of approximately $17,000. The
petitioner received from $4,000 to $5,000 per year rental from 1938 to 1943. From
1943 to 1950 she received $68,604. Considering the improvement from a business
standpoint, it represented a prudent investment for her own account. Cf. Caroline T.
Kissel, 15 B.T.A. 705, 706 (1929): "Since petitioner is deriving rentals from the
building, it follows that she is using the building in her business."
25. E.g., Dickey v. Stevens, 208 Ark. 111, 184 S.W.2d 955 (1945) (grantor who
retained life estate not allowed to charge the remainderman for improvements); Belfield
v. Findlay, 389 I1. 526, 60 N.E.2d 403 (1945) (improvements are deemed to have been
made for the benefit of the life tenant); Caldwell v. Jacob, 16 Ky. L. Rep. 21, 24, 22
S.W. 436, 437 (1893), modified on rehearing, 24 S.W. 86 (1894) (court gave two
reasons why improvements cannot be made a charge upon the estate of the remainder-
man: 1) To prevent the life tenant's consuming the remainderman's interest by making
improvements the remainderman does not desire or cannot pay for; 2) Improvements
are made for the life tenant's benefit, and usually without reference to the remainder-
man's wishes.). But ci. In re Whitney, 75 Misc 610, 136 N.Y.S. 633 (1912) (lift
tenant allowed compensation for improvements).
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Plaintiffs wound. There was no subsequent treatment by the defendant. On
December 28, 1948, the plaintiff underwent another operation, at which
time a sponge was discovered at the site of the previous operation by the
defendant. The present action was not commenced until October 28, 1949.
The plaintiff urged that the statute of limitations should not have run until
her discovery of the malpractice, because she could not have known, by the
exercise of reasonable diligence, that she had a cause of action for the injury
until after the second operation. The statute provided that an action for
malpractice should be brought within one year after the cause thereof ac-
crues.' The Supreme Court of Ohio, with one dissent, held that the fact that
Plaintiff did not know of her right of action did not prevent the statute from
running, and. Since the present action was commenced more than one year
after the termination of any professional relationship between Plaintiff and
Defendant, it was barred by the statute of limitations. The dissenting opin-
ion contended that the case fell within the peculiar and limited class of con-
tinuing tort; therefore, the cause of action could not have accrued until the
plaintiff had a reasonable opportunity to discover the malpractice. Delong v.
Campbell, 104 N.E.2d 177 (Ohio 1952).
The point under consideration in the instant case was whether the statu-
tory period of limitation should have been measured from the time the
physician-patient relationship ended,2 or from the time the patient discover-
ed the malpractice.3 Basically, there are three conflicting concepts involving
the application of the statute of limitations in actions for malpractice. The
general rule is that the statute begins to run from the time of the injury.4
Under this interpretation, the statute is not tolled even though the individual
may have had further professional relations with his doctor. A later concept
developed in which the statute of limitations is tolled until the relationship
of physician and patient is terminated.5 In recent years, a few courts have
held that the statute begins to run when the malpractice is discovered. 6
Under the last interpretation, a cause of action does not accrue until the
patient has had a reasonable time in which to discover the injury.
In a malpractice case, not only is there a tort committed upon the patient,
but there is also a breach of contract. Since most states prescribe separate
statutes of limitation for torts and contracts, the courts must decide which
statute to apply. As a result of this dilemma, four solutions have been tend-
ered by the courts. (1) If it is determined that there was a breach of a
1. Ohio Gen. Code §11225 (1910).
2. Thatcher v. De Tar, 351 Mo. 603, 173 S.W.2d 760 (1943) (Defendant
negligently left surgical needle in Plaintiff's body); Bowers v. Santee, 99 Ohio St.
361, 124 N.E. 238 (1919) (negligent setting of Plaintiff's fractured leg); Gillette .
Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E. 865, 871 (1902) (leading case) "'Her cause of action
accrues when her injuries occurred; and if these injuries blended and extended during
the entire period the surgeon was in charge of the case. her right of action became
cqomplete when the surgeon gave up the case without performing his duty."
3. Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 149 P.2d '372 (1944) ; (although Plaintiff
did not discover gauze pad until ten years after operation, action brought within two
years of discovery held not barred by two year statute).
4. See Ehlen v. Burrows, '51 Cal. App.2d 141. 124 P.2d 82. 84 (1942); Pellett
v. Sontone Corp., 55 Cal. APP.2d 158, 130 P.2d 181, 182 (1942);: Petrucci v. Hei-
denreich, 43 Cal. App.2d 561, 111 P.2d 421, 422 (1941).:
5. See note 2 supra.
6. Costa v. Regents of University of California, 247 P.2d 21 (1952); Greninger
v. Fischer, 81 Cal. Apo.2d 549, 184 P.2d 694 (1947) (statute does not start to run until
discovery, or the date when, by 'reasonable care, Plaintiff should have discovered wrong-
ful act); Faith v. Erhart, 52 Cal. App.2d 228, 126 P.2d 151 (1942).
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contractual relationship, then the courts may apply the statute of limitation
applicable to contracts. 7 (2) The majority of the courts apply the statute
of limitation applicable to injuries by negligence, whether the action is
brought for breach of contract or for tort.5 (3) In some jurisdictions, the
patient is allowed to bring his action either on the contract or for the tort
and the courts will invoke the proper statute. 9 (4) Because the same delict
may give rise to both a tort and a contract cause of action,") some states have
obviated any difficulty by enacting a special limitation for malpractice act-
ions."' As pointed out in the dissenting opinion in the instant case,
the plaintiff is subjected to onerous hardship because she did not learn of the
malpractice until long after her cause of action was barred.12 One cannot
overlook the contingency, however, that a great injustice may be done to the
physician if a statute of limitation does not begin to run until the cause of
action is discovered.
It has been held that ignorance of the injury or of the right to a cause of
action will not postpone the running of the statute.13 However, where the
person guilty of malpractice fraudulently conceals the fact, thus preventing
the injured party from obtaining knowledge thereof, the statute does not run
until the cause of action is discovered, or could have been discovered by the
reasonable diligence of the injured party.' 4 In North Dakota, anyone who
assumes a relation of personal confidence to another person renders himself
a trustee as to all dealings with that person.1 5 A physician is in a position of
trust and confidence with his patient and therefore is duty bound to act with
the utmost good faith toward the patient.16 Under the general rule that a
7. Sellers v. Noah, 209 Ala. 103, 95 So. 167, 168 (1923) "The counts declare
upon the breach of the surgeon's contract, . . . the reference to negligence therein
being but descriptive of the method . . . whereby the contract was breached"; Craw-
ford v. Duncan, 61 Cal. App. 647, 215 Pac. 578 (1928) (physican warranted that
no permanent scars would result, but treatment left scar); Finch v. Bursheim, 122
Minn. 152, 142 N.W. 148 (1918) (Defendant so negligently treated Plaintiff's broken
hip, that Plaintiff became crippled).
8. Mirich v. Balsinger, 58 Cal. App.2d 103, 127 P.2d 639 (1942) (surgeon
negligently performed plastic surgery on Plaintiff's nose); accord, Barnhoff V. Aldridge.
827 Mo. 767, 38 S.W.2d 1029 (1931) (Defendant, hired under oral contract, removed
one of Plaintiff's kidneys instead of diseased gall bladder); Monahan v. Devinny.
223 App. Div. 547, 229 N.Y.S. 60 (1928) (action tortious in its nature, but partial
relief available on contract).
9. Hickey v. Slattery, 103 Conn. 716, 131 Atl. 558, 559 (1926) (where two
distinct causes of action arise, each is limited by the statute appropriate to it).
10. See Hickey v. Slattery, supra note 9.
11. E.g., N.D. Rev. Code §28-0118 (8) (1943): "The following actions must
be commenced within two years after the cause of action has accrued: . . . (3) An
action for the recovery of damages resulting from malpractice."
12. See Becker v. Floersch, 153 Kan. 374, 110 P.2d 752 (1941) (Plaintiff
contended courts should not permit doctors to escape consequences of negligent acts
by simple expedient of statute of limitations).
13. Ogg v. Robb, 181 Iowa 145, 162 N.W. 217 (1917) (action for dam-
ages due to X-ray burn of which Plaintiff had knowledge).
14. N.D. Rev. Code 028-0116 (6) (1943): "The following actions must be
commenced within six years after the cause of action has accrued; . . . (6) An action
for relief on the ground of fraud in all cases both at law and in equity, the cause of
action in such cases not to be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the
aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud;" Schmucking v. Mayo, 183 Minn.
37, 235 N.W. 683. (1931) (Plaintiff submitted to goiter operation and claimed negli-
gent cutting of laryngeal nerve resulting in loss of speech).
15. N.D. Rev. Code §59-0108 (1943): Everyone who voluntarily assumes
a relation of personal confidence with another is deemed a trustee within the meaning
of this chapter . . . ".
16. Sec Tvedt v. Haugen, 70 N.D. 338, 347, 294 N.W. 183, 187 (1940).
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trustee may not obtain any advantage over the beneficiary by the slightest
misrepresentation or concealment,17 it would seem that a physician must
make a full disclosure of any defects in his treatment or the patient may hold
him liable on a fraud theory.
North Dakota is among the states that have provided a special statutory
limitation for malpractice actions.' 8 However, only two North Dakota mal-
practice cases have raised the statute as a defense.19 One case was dismissed
for lack of evidence,20 and the other held that the statute of limitation was
not a good defense. '
M. R. MCINTEE
STATUTES - INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION - ELECTORS' AUTHoRI-
ZATION TO INCREASE TAX LEVY PAST "LEGAL LIMIT" WHERE "LEGAL LIMIT"
SUBSEQUENTLY CHANGED BY LEGISLATURE. - In the year 1946 the governing
board of the Osago School District decided that the amount of money which
would be raised by a levy of taxes at the rate of 22 mills - the maximum
amount then permitted 1 - would be insufficient to meet the needs of the
district. Following statutory procedures, the question of increasing the tax
levy fifty per cent above the 22 mill limit was submitted to the electors of
the district at a special election.2 The increase was approved by the voters
and the maximum tax limit was thus raised an additional eleven mills, mak-
ing the total limit thirty-three mills. In 1947 the legislature amended the
statute to permit school districts to levy taxes not to exceed thirty-six mills.
The school district officials thereupon took the position that the permission
to make an excess levy which they had received at the election was still
valid, and made a levy of 50.12 mills, which was 14.12 mills in excess of the
thirty-six mill limitation. Plaintiff, a taxpayer, brought an action to recover
taxes paid under protest, contending that a new excess levy could not be
made without a further authorization from the voters of the school district.
Held, judgment for plaintiff. The amended statute furnished no basis to
which school district officers might apply the percentage of increase voted
by school districts in elections held when the prior limit of 22 mills was in
effect. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Severson, 50 N.W.2d 889 (N.D. 1952).
It must be conceded that if the validity of the excess tax computed on
the thirty-six mill base depended on a retrospective effect 3 being given to
17. N.D. Rev. Code §59-0109 (1943).
18. See note 11 supra.
19. Milde v. Leigh, 75 N.D. 418, 28 N.W.2d 530 -(1947) (in husband's action
against surgeon for loss of wife's consortium and expenses resulting from ineffective
sterilivation operation, whereupon she thereafter gave birth to a child, permanently
impairing her health, held his cause of action arose after the wife became pregnant
and was not barred by limitations); Scheid v. Cavanagh, 65 N.D. 596, 260 N.W.
619 (1935) (wooden applicator left in Plantiff's nostril without discovery for three
years).
20. Scheid v. Cavanagh, 65 N.D. 596, 260 N.W. 619 (1935).
21. Milde v. Leigh, 75 N.D. 418, 28 N.W.2d 530 (1947).
1. The statute in force at the time was N.D. Rev. Code §57-1514 (1943).
2. The governing statutes may be found in Chapter 57-16, N.D. Rev. Code (1943).
3. "Retrospective or retroactive laws are generally defined, from a legal view
point, as those which take away or impair vested rights acquired under existing laws
or create a new obligation, impose a new duty, or attach a new disability, in respect
to transactions or considerations already past." Harlan v. State, 31 Ala.App. 478,
18 So.2d 744 (1944).
